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The Black Book of Chilean Justice
ALEJANDRA MATUS
Each time I tell my story, I do so thinking that it will be the last
time, that I will write my next column in the past tense in my native
Chile. But once again here I am, searching for words that have not lost
their meaning.
When I first wrote these words some months ago, I had been living
in exile in the United States for two years, and although I've built up
hope with each step, reality came close to crushing my hope. I could
have remained in exile for thirteen years or faced immediate detention,
prosecution, and a probable sentence for up to five years in prison if I
returned to my country. That is not because I stole something, or injured
someone. It was merely the consequence of exercising my right to free-
dom of expression and my professional duty to inform.
This was not exactly what I had in mind when I attended the April,
1999 launching of my second book, El Libro Negro de la Justicia
Chilena [The Black Book of Chilean Justice].1 I knew there were some
risks involved in publishing an expos6 about the Chilean judiciary, but
hoped Chile's democracy had become a lot stronger in the nine years
after Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship ended in 1990.2
There was not much evidence, however, to support my hope: just
before I finished writing the Black Book, four journalists had been prose-
cuted for publishing material that might be condisered offensive to a
public official.3 I felt concerned that the same fate could await me. As I
wrote in my book: "[I]t appears absurd and perhaps ridiculous to admit
that I have felt these fears, and that in some ways I still live with them,
even though Chile recovered its democracy almost a decade ago."4
With these concerns in mind, I wrote down the names and phone
numbers my husband would have to contact in case I was arrested after
the publication day. I also contacted some organizations in the United
States to ask them to react if something did happen to me. I wished that
these precautions were unnecessary, but never really considered not pub-
lishing the book. At least, I knew I was not going to be killed; that was
1. ALEJANDRA ACUtJA MATUS, EL LIBRo NEGRO DE LA JUSTICIA CHILENA (1999).
2. Calvin Sims, Chile's Ex-Dictator Tries to Dictate his Future Role, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1998, at A3.
3. Sebastian Rotella, Chile's Insult Laws Take Slap at Democracy, L.A. TIMES, May 1,
1999, at A2.
4. MATUS, supra note 1, at 12.
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one of the differences between persecution of journalists under dictator-
ship and the new, more sophisticated "legal" persecution that existed
under "democracy." Unfortunately, if unsurprisingly, my fears were
confirmed on May 14, 1999, one day after my book was published,
when Supreme Court Justice Servando Jorddn issued a ban on my book.
This was accompanied with a warrant for my arrest.
The Black Book of Chilean Justice is a six-year investigation that
recounts the observations of an inconspicuous witness. It is also an
account of the history of the Chilean judicial system. I did my best to
remain true to the facts in the book's six chapters. You won't find in it
any "offense." If there is any sort of thesis in those 350 pages, it would
be that the judicial system in Chile has never been independent. To the
contrary, the book contains evidence that the judiciary has bent easily to
political, economic, and military pressure. The Chilean Judiciary, is far
from being adapted to a democratic system of government and it would
work better in a monarchical system. In fact the judiciary actually was
created by a monarchical system and has never been truly reformed.
The Black Book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is
entitled "The Degraded Power." It is about the decadence and cases of
corruption, abuse of power, political tensions in the Chilean Supreme
Court immediately after the post-Pinochet era from 1990-1994. The
second chapter, "The Rosende Era," is about the efforts of the Secretary
of Justice (a kind of Attorney General) during Dictator Agusto
Pinochet's regime to perpetuate a Supreme Court loyal to the dictator-
ship. The next chapter, "From the Real Audiencia to the Golpe de
Estado," relates the history of the Chilean judiciary, a topic rarely men-
tioned in Chilean history. Chapter four, "The Power Rituals," concerns
the complacency of the Supreme Court at the beginning of Pinochet's
dictatorship, around 1973. The next chapter, "Docudrama in Five Chap-
ters: Justice and Human Rights," is about the treatment that the Chilean
judiciary gave to complaints of human rights violations under Pinochet's
dictatorship. "It's Reform Time," the final chapter, concerns recent
efforts to change the Chilean judicial system and describes some
changes on the Supreme Court during the late 1990s.
The book starts in the present, travels to the past to search for
explanations, and then comes back to the present. Throughout the book,
I attempt to describe the unique characteristics of the Chilean Criminal
System. My intention is not to describe the whole content of the Black
Book, but to give the reader an idea of how very different the Chilean
judiciary is from the American and modern European systems. For
5. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE & LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1976).
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example, in a criminal case in the United States, the prosecutor's office
(state or federal) conducts an investigation and may subsequently file
charges. In open court, both the prosecution and the defense would have
an equal opportunity to argue their positions and try to persuade a jury.
The fundamental principle of the American system is the presumption of
innocence. In the American system, the judge is more an arbitrator than
part of the process. He or she makes sure that the rules are applied fairly.
To understand the Chilean system, the familiar American concepts
have to be turned upside down. In Chile, the same judge will conduct the
investigation, file the charges, and pronounce the sentence. He is the
FBI, the prosecutor, the jury, and the judge all rolled into one. There is
neither jury, nor open proceedings. Everything is kept in papers, and,
for the most part, in secret even to the defendant. This process is consid-
ered by many scholars as an "inquisitive" one, because, in contrast to the
United States, guilt, not innocence, is the presumption.6
Administratively, the Chilean Judiciary is an extremely hierarchical
system, comparable to a military infrastructure or to the Vatican. The
Supreme Court, at the top of the pyramid, annually examines the qualifi-
cations of its members to determine which should be promoted to a
higher position (from judge to magistrate of the court of appeals, for
example). The government eventually selects from those designated for
promotion from the lists. Citizens do not participate in the selection of
judges, nor does any government department oversee the conduct of the
highest court officials. The singular and dramatic method of political
control is solely Congressional impeachment. Until recently, the last
word on nominations to the Supreme Court and courts of appeals came
from the executive branch of the government. Recent changes in the
law, however, require ratification from two thirds of the Senate.
As one can imagine, with such a structure, a judge may feel the
need to favor the desires of his superiors in order to be promoted. Since
most of the judicial decisions are made in secret, lawyers and lobbyists
can visit the judges ex parte after work hours without any sign on the
public record. The secretitive nature of the Chilean process invites cor-
ruption, abuse of power, nepotism, and other irregularities. The situa-
tion is well documented in my book.
Argentinean professor Luis Moreno Ocampo, author of En Defensa
Propia: C6mo Salir de la Corrupcidn7 asserts that regarding systems,
6. Robert G. Vaughn, Proposals for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 578,
582 (1993); see also MERRYMAN, supra note 5, at 134-39; see generally Carlos Rodrigo de la
Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal
Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE. AM. 323 (1998).
7. Luis MORENO OcAMPo, EN DEFENSA PROPIA: C6Mo SALIR DE LA CORRUPCION [IN SELF
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there is a formula for corruption: "Monopoly (M) plus discretionality
(D) less transparency (T) equals corruption (C)."8 According to
Moreno, "the greater the monopoly of an entity, the greater the discre-
tion its executives and employees have to take decisions, and the lesser
the transparency in the process, the greater the possibility of acts of cor-
ruption: C=M+D-T." 9
This equation was created to analyze business corporations, but
applies perfectly to a public organization like the Chilean judiciary.
However, this application carries an even greater consequence, as it is
not the money of private investors at risk, but tax payers money. More
importantly, the trust of the people in the independence and fairness of
their judiciary, the only institution (along with the press, I would say)
that they can turn to in order to stop the abuses of the government.
Clearly, it is the influence of the powerful in the judiciary's decision-
making that is the most serious problem.
This environment was idyllic for Pinochet's dictatorship. The most
dramatic consequence of the defects of Chilean judiciary was the
Supreme Court's complete obedience to General Augusto Pinochet dur-
ing his dictatorship. Indeed, that body did virtually nothing to save the
lives and protect the rights of Chileans during the Pinochet regime. For
example, of the approximately 5,000 habeas corpus petitions presented
from 1973 through 1979, only one was accepted, but to my knowledge,
never enforced. '0
In an attempt to obstruct any further human rights violations accu-
sations, Pinochet appointed Hugo Rosenda as secretary of justice.
Rosenda was charged with nominating judges to the Supreme Court who
he believed would be loyal to Pinochet. " In 1990, when the first demo-
cratic President, Patricio Aylwin, took power, sixteen of the seventeen
judges in the Supreme Court had been appointed during Pinochet's dic-
tatorship. They did not make Aylwin's life easy. One of those judges
was Servando Jordin.12
Let me share an excerpt from my book to provide a clearer under-
standing of the situation:
Barely had he assumed his position as Minister of Justice [equivalent
to the United States General Attorney] in January of 1984, [when
Hugo] Rosende took a step that had been rejected by the Supreme
DEFENSE: How To ESCAPE FROM CORRUPON] 171 (1993) (passage translated by Alejandra
Matus).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See MATUS supra note 1, at 264.
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id.
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Court the year before. He increased the number of magistrates in the
highest tribunal from thirteen to sixteen. The names of three new
members had been selected by the secretary even before the new
spots were created. The order with which they were named was ana-
lyzed very carefully. First, Heman Cereceda [was appointed] on Jan-
uary 10, 1985. The ex-minister and ex-president of the Court of
Appeals counted on the minimum number of formal requirements to
ascend. Of course, in addition, and most importantly, with the politi-
cal merits: a complete affinity were the military government.
General Pinochet had given him an award on one occasion and
Cereceda showed his gratitude. Rosende "put his hands to the fire"
for him. Afterwards, Jorddin [was appointed] on January 15, [1985].
Given his longevity, his appointment could not be delayed. Some
members of the [Pinochet's] cabinet, including Jaime del Valle, had
an excellent opinion of him. Nevertheless, others had doubts. His per-
sonal background was well known: he had a proclivity for alcohol
and brothels from his time as magistrate in Punto Arenas. However,
Rosende considered him an unconditional supporter, and this was
what mattered. However, Jorddn was deliberately named second, to
prevent the opportunity for him to ascend to the presidency of the
tribunal before Cereceda. [Rosendel did not realize at the time that
his preferred candidate would be removed from office by a constitu-
tional accusation, and that it would be Jordin who would become
president in 1996.
The third person on the list named on January 21, [1985] was
Enrique Zurita. Zurita was a modest man, a trustworthy and friendly
individual, who had overcome many difficulties arising from his poor
upbringing. Historically, Zurita maintained a pro-military posture.
With the appointments of Cereceda and Jordin, both in line with
the goals of the military government, people began to speak of an
institution rarely discussed before. That is, the practice of the lawyers
with connections to the Supreme Court. The great consortiums and
business people began to retain these professionals in order to
increase the likelihood of success before the highest court. Despite
the complaints of the Chilean Bar [Colegio de Abogados], amongst
others, asking for an end of ex parte communications, a somewhat
organized circle was created in order to carry out the trafficking of
influence. Some lawyers even asked their clients for extra payments
to "sensitize" the judges. The honest and independent magistrates,
even in their situation of being witnesses to these acts, were not able
to react or to oppose them. The object was political control. 3
As the years passed, some of those judges appointed during the
Pinochet era have changed their criteria on some issues (like human
13. Id. at 128-29 (passage translated by Lauren Giblert).
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right cases), perhaps reading the writing on the wall. Some did so
because they were unable to express their honest opinion under dictator-
ship. Others did so because they felt their careers depended on it. In
sum, just as some of the Supreme Court judges followed the official
guidance during the dictatorship to deny justice, they are now doing so
to advance their careers. Moreover, most of Pinochet's Supreme Court
nominees have now retired. This is a direct result of a new law that
imposes an age limit of seventy-five-years-old on members of the
court. 4
Some important reforms in criminal proceedings have been recently
enacted. In particular, orality is now allowed. Unfortunately, it could
take ten years before these reforms are effective throughout the whole
system.' 5 Notwithstanding these reforms, a basic problem remains
unchanged. It is still necessary for judges to pay attention to powerful
parties in order to ascend in their careers, compromising a judge's most
important asset: judicial independence.
The description of the Chilean judicial systems in my book, along
with descriptions of specific cases, came from the perspective of a jour-
nalist who is more adept at describing facts and human behavior than
writing abstract analysis. I did not have an agenda or any personal feel-
ings either pro or con towards any people mentioned in my book. I am a
journalist motivated only by a sense of professional duty. My work,
however, has led to a serious crime in the eyes of the Chilean courts.
According to them, my Black Book is a crime against national security.
1 6
On April 14, 1999, less than twenty-four hours after the public
presentation of my book, civil-police agents, the Chilean equivalent to
the FBI, arrived at Editorial Planeta, the publisher of my Black Book.
Along with them, they brought a tiny piece of paper empowering them
to enter the building, but not offering reasons for the confiscation of the
first edition of my book, nor justification for the prohibition against its
reprinting. The General Editor of Editorial Planeta, Carlos Orellana,
called me at the apartment where I was staying to tell me the news of the
raid. We agreed almost instinctively to notify the press. The company's
General Manager, Bartolo Ortiz, accompanied the police agents to Edi-
torial Planeta's warehouses. Waiting for them were camera crews and
reporters who captured images of employees hauling out boxes of my
books to turn over to the police. Those images were circulated all over
the world and provoked hot discussion about Chilean politics. It seemed
14. See United States Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2000
Chile, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rs/hrrpt/2000 (released Feb. 2001).
15. See id.
16. See id.
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unacceptable to people that after nine years of democracy, Chilean
authorities were confiscating books in a manner reminiscent of the Span-
ish Inquisition. The criticism was not enough to stem the fury of either
Servando Jorddin, the former Supreme Court justice who accused me of
offending him, or the diligence of Rafael Huerta, who had been put in
charge of my case.
Almost immediately after receiving Orellana's call, my brother
Jean Pierre, a professor of law, called to advise me of the severity of the
situation. He told me that authorities had accused me of violating
Chile's State Security Law.17 My brother urged me to flee the country
before a detention order was entered that would destroy my personal and
professional plans and prevent me form leaving the country for a long
time.
Along with my husband Jorge Junco, a United States citizen, I
packed up our belongings as fast as I could and headed to the airport.
We bought plane tickets, and without enough time to say goodbye to our
families and friends, we went to Buenos Aires, Argentina. We waited
there for ten days until all the commotion, which I thought was tempo-
rary, died down. I soon realized, however, that the controversy was just
beginning, and we were forced to move to Miami, Florida.
A great deal has happened since I left Chile. The editors of Edito-
rial Planeta, Orellana and Ortiz, were jailed for two and a half days, and
were accused of violating the State Security Laws, the same crimes that
I had been charged with. Eventually, the courts determined that only I
could be charged for that crime and my editors were released. In the
United States, I filed a lawsuit against the government of Chile before
the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights (IACHR). 18 Last year, the IACHR accepted my
case and I offered to settle with the Chilean government if they would
repeal at least three insults laws that remained in Chilean legislation,
along with some other provisions that grant judges the authority to cen-
sor the press. I did not receive any official response. It is my belief that
this year the IACHR will probably punish Chile for this flagrant viola-
tion of freedom of expression, as well as the right of Chilean citizens to
be informed. During this period I also requested political asylum in the
United States by alleging that the fate that awaits me in Chile is illegiti-
17. See generally C6DIGO PENAL [C6D. PEN.], Ley No. 12.927, Seguridad del Estado [State
Security Law] art. 6(b) (1975) (Chile). Violation of this law brings with it a prison sentence of up
to five years for anyone who libels or defames any of Chile's principle authorities, including the
Supreme Court justices. See Brett Sebastian, Chile Progress Stalled: Setbacks in Freedom of
Expression Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH Vol. 13 No. 1(B), Mar. 2001, at 21.
18. See generally Case 12.142, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (forthcoming 2002), available at http://
www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/chapteriii/chilel 2.142.htm.
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mate and persecutory. In record time, I was granted asylum in Novem-
ber 1999.
Journalism organizations around the world, especially those in the
United States, sent letters of protest to the Chilean government. In fact,
Santiago A. Cant6n, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
for the OAS, visited Chile to review this case and recommended the
repealing of insult laws. 19 Still, nothing has been done to enable my
book to be back in circulation, and at the time, I believed I could not
return to my country without the fear of imprisonment. The Chilean
courts have rejected each and every one of the proposals that my pub-
lishers and my brother have made. Huerta retired, but his successor,
Jaime Rodriguez, has not changed the government's position, nor has he
even revealed the bases of the accusations against me.
Just before Christmas 2000, Rodriguez closed the case temporarily.
The arrest warrant, however, remained in effect. At that time, he had the
option of declaring my innocence or even dismissing all charges. In his
very inquisitive way, Rodriguez took the testimony of: former President,
Patricio Aylwin; former Secretary of Justice, Francisco Cumplido; and
former Attorney General, Guillermo Piedrabuena. Each of them con-
firmed the truth of my assertions about Jorddn. Nonetheless, truth is not
defense under the State Security Law and the charges remained in
place.20
What is the law in question? The State Security Law, a 1957 spe-
cial law, purports to protect public order and national security. It pro-
vides in Article 6(b):
[tlhose who publicly insult the flag, the coat of arms or the national
anthem, and those who defame, slander, or libel the President of the
Republic, Ministers of State, Senators or Deputies, members of the
superior courts, the Comptroller General of the Republic, Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, or the Director General of the
National Police, whether or not this defamation, slander, or libel was
committed by reason of the office of the victim.2 1
In the same law, Article 16 adds that: "[i]f through the press or printed
media.., any crime against the security of the State were committed...
in serious cases, the judge could order the immediate seizure of the com-
plete edition containing any abuse of publicity condemned by this
19. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1999, Report of
the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 106, doc. 3
rev., at 47 (2000), available at http://www.cidh.org [hereinafter 1999 Report].
20. See Chile Progress Stalled, supra note 17.
21. C6D. PEN., Ley No. 12.927, Seguridad del Estado [State Security Law] art. 6(b) (1975)
(Chile).
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law."22 Article 30 also permits the judge to order the confiscation of any
materials used in the commission of the crime, even before any investi-
gation or hearing.23
Considered by both Human Rights Watch and the Committee to
Protect Journalists as one of the most repressive insult laws remaining in
effect in Latin America, the State Security Law does not stand alone in
Chilean legislation. In the 1998 report The Limits of Tolerance: Free-
dom of Expression and the Public Debate in Chile, Human Rights
Watch noted that:
Chile has a set of laws whose purpose is to punish expressions of
contempt for those occupying high positions in any of the three
branches of government. Contempt of authority provisions exist in
the Criminal Code, in the State Security Law, and also in the Code of
Military Justice. The underlying logic of these laws rests on the
notion that people are obliged to show respect to those in authority
because of their rank, reflecting a view of the ordinary person as a
subject rather than a citizen.24
Contempt of authority offenses are dealt with according to special
norms that reduce due process guarantees and rights of defense and pre-
scribe higher penalties. In the case of Article 6(b), the rules of the Chil-
ean Military Code govern. Insult laws, known generically as leyes de
desacato (laws of contempt), have been criticized by the IACHR. In its
1995 report on these laws, the IACHR concluded that "Desacato laws
are incompatible with Article 13 of the American Convention on Human
Rights because they suppress the freedom of expression necessary for
the proper functioning of a democratic society. 25
The IACHR argued that these laws are unnecessary because:
The special protection desacato laws afford public functionaries from
insulting or offensive language is not congruent with the objective of
a democratic society to foster public debate. This is particularly so in
the light of a government's dominant role in society and particularly
where other means are available to reply to unjustified attacks
through the government's access to the media or individual civil
actions of libel or slander. Any criticism that is not related to the
official's position may be subject, as is the case for all private indi-
viduals, to ordinary libel, slander and defamation actions. In this
sense, the government's prosecution of a person who criticizes a pub-
22. Id. art. 16.
23. Id. art. 30.
24. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE: FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION & THE
PUBLIC DEBATE IN CHILE 48 (1998) (hereinafter THE LIMrrs OF TOLERANCE).
25. Id. at 51 (quoting Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
1994, Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato Laws" with the American Convention on Human
Rights, OEA/Sev.L/VI 1. 88, 1995, available at http://www.oas.org).
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lic official acting in his or her official capacity does not comply with
the requirements of Article 13(2) because the protection of honor in
this context is conceivable without restricting criticism of the public
administration. As such, these laws are also an unjustified means to
limit certain speech that is already restricted by laws that all persons,
regardless of their status, may invoke.26
The IACHR considered it inevitable that contempt of authority laws
have a chilling effect on the freedom of expression.
Between the restoration of Chilean democracy and the publication
of the Human Rights Watch report in December 1998, I believe more
than twenty-five people had been prosecuted under the State Security
Law, more than half of them journalists. Other desacato laws, such as
the Improper Sedition Law found in Chile's Military Code of Justice,27
have been applied with similar effects to protect the honor of Army offi-
cials against journalists, lawyers, and even soldiers. This so-called
"crime" is defined in Article 276 of the Code of Military Justice,28 as the
inducement of any disturbance through speech, writing or any other
medium. Such crimes incude informing troops of matters that may
cause them discontent or half-heartedness in their service.29
In 1994, I also became a victim of these laws. I wrote an article
that year exposing acts of corruption in the Military Hospital of Santi-
ago, implicating its former director and two active-duty generals.3" The
report appeared on the front page of the newspaper, and resulted in
immediate denials from the Army. In the hours following the publica-
tion of this piece, the newspaper received over twenty calls from
unknown persons asking for my second last name, with different and
improbable excuses, but probably to be able to obtain additional infor-
mation regarding my background. The army commenced a legal action
in the Military Courts against Ascanio Cavallo, the director of the news-
paper, along with myself, based on the Improper Sedition Law.
Simultaneously, the generals mentioned in my article brought suit
for libel and slander in civilian criminal court. This could have both
penal and civil consequences if sustained, under another restrictive law
affecting freedom of expression, the Law on Abuse of Publicity. 3' Pres-
sured by the demands and against my advice, the editor of the paper
26. THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE, supra note 24, at 52 (quoting Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 1994, supra note 25, at 201).
27. Delitos Contra el Orden y Seguridad, art. 276 (1986) (Chile).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Alejandra Matus, Indagan Presunto Fraude en Hospital Militar, LA EPOCA, Aug. 12,
1994. See also THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE, supra note 24, at 84.
31. Delitos Contra el Orden Publico, art. 6(b) (1992) (Chile).
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gave in and retracted my article on the front page. I believed that we
should continue investigating in order to demonstrate the article's accu-
racy. Four years later, the Army, overcome with the weight of the evi-
dence, finally acknowledged that the accused generals had been under
investigation since the publication of my article. They were finally pros-
ecuted for the very irregularities that I had revealed in my article. I am
unaware if the case against Cavallo and I was ever dismissed since the
investigator for Human Rights Watch was denied access to any relevant
information by the Military Courts.
The extensive quantity and the severity of Chilean regulations
against freedom of expression have led Human Rights Watch to declare
that the freedom of expression "so central to democracy, is more
restricted in Chile than possibly any other democratic country in the
Western hemisphere." Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, the Human Rights Watch
Executive Director to the Americas, recently said in a radio interview
that in Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, Chile has the most
repressive legislation on freedom of expression. For a country held out
as a bastion of democracy in the region, the comparison to Castro is
shameful. While admittedly no one has been executed in Chile for
expressing his or her opinion in the last ten years, I believe public debate
is probably more restricted in Chile than in Argentina, Colombia, and
Mexico, where such killings of professionals have indeed taken place.
Human Rights Watch explained this unexpected phenomenon:
Violations of freedom of expression in Chile are atypical when com-
pared with other countries in the hemisphere... In Chile, journalists
and opposition politicians do not generally face physical risk, but the
public debate appears comparatively muted, attenuated and timorous,
as if uninhibited expression were either personally risky or dangerous
to society. Since the return to democratic rule, violations of freedom
of expression can be traced not to repressive action by the executive
branch but to the persistence of laws that fail to protect essential dem-
ocratic values and hamper the vigorous discussion that democracy
requires.32
In my opinion, only the repeal of the desacato laws will allow Chilean
law to approach international norms and accepted principles relating to
freedom of expression. Despite the fact that the current government in
Chile has the requisite majorities in Congress to repeal these laws, the
idea has not even been given serious consideration since the demise of
the Pinochet's dictatorship. It has been a long and difficult process to
even try to repeal Article 6(b) of the State Security Law. As of now, it is
uncertain that it will ever happen.
32. THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE, supra note 24, at 40.
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Eduardo Frei, President of Chile when my book was initially
banned, had indicated his support for the repeal of Article 6(b).
Although representatives of his government recognized the injustice of
my situation, there has been no move to implement the recommenda-
tions of the IACHR regarding freedom of the press. 33 Even more tell-
ing, are remarks made by Alejandro Salinas during a celebrated event in
Washington to discuss this issue before the IACHR. Salinas, a represen-
tative from the Chilean government, tried to discredit my complaints.
"[Matus] faces no risk in Chile. She can go back whenever she wants. 34
As if to confirm this contradiction, President Frei's administration
supported a bill that would have repealed Article 6(b) of the State Secur-
ity Law yet, at the same time, would have fortified similar laws in the
Chilean Penal Code. Frei's administration ended in March 2000 and his
proposal never made it out of Congress.
Ricardo Lagos, Chile's current president, has been more explicitly
empathetic toward my situation. During his campaign, he personally
called me to tell me that if elected, his government would do its best to
amend Article 6(b) so that it would be possible for me to return to Chile
and that the absurd censorship of my book would finally come to an end.
After Congress rejected an initial proposal, the President submitted a
new legislative package to Congress that included a Press Law and the
repeal of Article 6(b). If approved, the Press Law would remove certain
restrictions on the practice of journalism. The law, however, would also
create new obstacles to freedom of press such as a prohibition on the
filming or recording of private actions of public officials. For example,
this law would have made it a crime to tape and show Peruvian strong
man, Vladimiro Montesinos, bribing a congressmen. Such a tape led to
the resignation of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. The future of
this less than ideal bill is uncertain. As of this writing, it remains tied up
in Congressional debate. That's why I proposed to the government,
through the IACHR, that the government present a bill that would only
repeal all desacato laws, and not add other legislation that would restrict
freedom of expression. The less restrictions, the better. As I said, I never
got a response from the government.
In March 2001, Human Rights Watch released a follow up to their
1998 report on freedom of expression in Chile. The new report stated:
In February 2001, six individuals, three of them former political pris-
oners under the military dictatorship, three of them journalists work-
ing for a Santiago newspaper, were accused of insulting public
33. See 1999 Report, supra note 19, at 44-47.
34. These remarks were made at the IACHR conference in Washington, D.C. I repeat them
verbatim. (notes on file with author).
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authorities, a crime under Chile's notorious State Security Law. They
faced trial and possible imprisonment for exercising their right to free
expression. This sudden crop of new State Security Law prosecutions
has once more thrown into sharp relief the Chilean state's long-stand-
ing failings in the area of freedom of speech.
Since Human Rights Watch's report The Limits of Tolerance:
Freedom of Expression and the Public Debate in Chile was published
in November, 1998, Chile has publicly recognized the need to make
extensive legal reforms to protect freedom of expression. Progress
toward these reforms, however, has been dismally slow. Indeed, most
of the reforms described in our 1998 report as pending in Congress
still await enactment more than two years later.
The most glaring example of the sluggish pace of reform is the
bill to regulate the press and to protect the rights of journalists (here-
inafter referred to as the "Press Law"), that has languished in Con-
gress for a full eight years. The bill was expected to finally become
law during the first year of the government of President Ricardo
Lagos, who entered office in March 2000, but such hopes were
dashed when legislators failed to agree on the package before Con-
gress began its summer recess in February 2001.
The draft Press Law includes long-overdue provisions to elimi-
nate the crime of contempt of authority [desacato] from the State
Security Law, and to strip judges of their powers under that law to
confiscate publications. It was not until April, 1999, nine years after
Chile returned to democracy, that the administration of Lagos' prede-
cessor, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, first announced legislation to repeal
these sections of the State Security Law, which clearly violate bind-
ing international norms on freedom of expression. Since then, twelve
journalists, editors, politicians, and ordinary citizens have been con-
victed, charged, or face trial under the State Security Law for exercis-
ing their right to freedom of expression.
A consensus has emerged, albeit painfully slowly, on the need to
do away with these antiquated provisions, which make criticism of
public authorities a public order offense subject to especially severe
penalties. While this is an advance on earlier years, the political will
needed to repeal them has been lacking. Moreover, even assuming
that these undemocratic laws are soon rescinded, the principle on
which they depend-that authorities of state deserve special protec-
tion against "unreasonable" criticism-has still not been seriously
challenged by Chile's lawmakers. Indeed, during the congressional
debate on the Press Law, a government effort to repeal the contempt
of authority provisions of the ordinary Criminal Code (which are very
similar in wording to the questioned articles of the State Security
Law) was decisively rejected. Some members of Congress, faced
with the prospect of these provisions' repeal, even sought to intro-
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duce a measure that would make criticism of government authorities
an especially grave form of libel.
Proposals like this run counter to international freedom of
expression principles now well established in democracies across the
world. Indeed, international human rights law holds that the limits of
permissible criticism must be wider with regard to a person in public
office than with regard to a private citizen, because of the overriding
need in a democracy for public authorities to be held accountable to
public opinion. Tolerance of criticism, even ill-founded and unfair
criticism, is one of the obligations of public office in a democracy.
Chile's politicians have shown little sign that they appreciate the
overriding importance of the principle. To implement it, all crimes of
contempt of authority and criminal defamation protecting govern-
ment officials must be eliminated from the legal system. Until that is
achieved, the repeal of sections of the State Security Law will only be
a partial, even if important, advance.
Will there be any change to the law? The government recently reas-
sured that there would be. The experience of the past two-years makes it
difficult to believe, particularly when compared to cases where the poli-
ticians had a real desire for change. For example, in the first year of the
Lagos administration, it took thirty-six hours for the government to
approve a bill granting soldiers protection from having their names dis-
closed and legal immunity if they gave information leading to the
whereabouts of the remains of an individual killed under Pinochet's
dictatorship.
Chilean officials have not shown the same interest in freedom of
expression. This is a serious situation, especially in a country proud of
its democratic system. An amicus curiae brief presented by the Com-
mittee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in support of my case before the
IACHR, explains:
Criminal defamation laws are disfavored worldwide. Criminal prose-
cution of journalists is especially disfavored where a government
seeks to prosecute a journalist for reporting on public officials and
matters of public concern. The Commission has given vital support
to the international criticism of criminal defamation laws, both with
its 1994 Report on desacato laws and the recent Inter-American Dec-
laration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. Article 6(b) of the
Chilean State Security Law is among the worst criminal defamation
laws in the hemisphere. The Commission should urge Chile to repeal
Article 6(b) and other, similar provisions of Chilean law.36
In another passage, that institution asserts:
35. See Brett Sebastian, supra note 17.
36. Brief of Amicus Curial Committee to Protect Journalists at 11, Acufia v. Chile, 12.142,
Int. Am. C.H.R. (2001).
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The Chilean government's seizure of The Black Book flagrantly vio-
lates the American Convention. The plain language of Article 13(2)
of the Convention absolutely prohibits prior censorship. Indeed, only
five years ago the Commission held that Chile violated Article 13
when the Santiago Appeals Court enjoined the distribution of another
work of investigative journalism. By confiscating The Black Book,
Chile has become the only democracy in the Americas in recent years
to violate the American Convention's edict against censorship. CPJ
is unaware of any other instance in the last four years in which the
government of any nation in the Americas- except for Cuba -cen-
sored a journalistic work because it allegedly defamed public
officials.3 7
The illegal censorship of The Black Book of Chilean Justice has
lasted for nearly two years. The arguments of CPJ and other similar
institutions have been presented by my defense to the Chilean courts
with no success. The other possibility, derogation of the desacato laws,
seems unlikely at this point. That is why my only chance of justice is the
invocation of international treaties before the ICHR. Should the courts
rule in my favor, it would send a powerful message to Chilean govern-
ment as well as an incentive to change the laws that restrict freedom of
expression.
CPJ states that there is not doubt about Chile's violations of inter-
national conventions:
Desacato laws originated long ago, in an era when monarchs ruled
without regard to the consent of the people they governed and there-
fore saw no reason to permit criticism of their decisions. The very
purpose of desacato laws is to shield the government from criticism
• . . These laws criminalize the most important form of political
speech: criticism of the official conduct of government leaders.
Moreover, Article 6(b) and similar laws rest on the misguided notion
that insulting high government functionaries endangers "public
order." Public officials cannot truly maintain order if they are
immune from criticism.38
In addition, laws such as Article 6(b) do not require proof that a
statement is false or that the statement was published with "actual mal-
ice," that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with serious doubt as to its
truth. According to the CPJ:
Indeed, laws like Article 6(b) are often applied to punish true state-
ments simply because the statements are offensive to persons in
power. These laws therefore discourage honest, critical reporting and
prevent the public from accurately determining whether its leaders
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 26.
20021
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
are doing a good job. In short, Article 6(b) is a dangerous anachro-
nism. The Commission has concluded that desacato laws violate the
American Convention and should be repealed.39
Indeed, Chilean legislation requires a far less stringent standard for
truth as a defense against a desacato law than many experts suggest.
Further, according to CPJ:
CPJ is aware of no evidence that Ms. Matus's allegedly defamatory
statements were false, let alone evidence that Ms. Matus acted with
reckless disregard for the truth. To the contrary, the facts show that
Ms. Matus firmly believed The Black Book to be entirely true and
followed standard journalistic practices in citing sources for what she
wrote. Ms. Matus spent six years meticulously researching The Black
Book. She has stated publicly that she took pains to present balanced
profiles of the judges who appear in it.n°
Unfortunately, the only thing that remains certain is that the books
confiscated on April 14 remained locked away in a police warehouse
because some judge in Chile said that my book offended him and, there-
fore, should be banned.4" In the introduction of my book, I wrote, some-
what prophetically:
Without true freedom of the press, journalism becomes corrupt, loses
its ethical standing and may be transformed into something mon-
strous: inquisitive, bold, biting, discrediting and, even, cruel to those
who do not have laws to protect them; tolerant, compliant and servile
with the powerful, including of course, those authorities journalism is
called on to investigate. We believe [we, meaning the publishers and
I] in freedom of expression and we believe in the necessity of hard-
hitting journalism that investigates and informs, that does not try to
denigrate people or institutions but that does not hesitate to go after
the truth, although this will inevitable perturb some of society's pow-
erful. This last point may be an obstacle because a book like this,
written in accord to these principles, however necessary, socially and
culturally, clearly runs the risk of inciting the wrath of those who
have defined themselves as the incarnations of Public Virtue, Secur-
ity and Patriotism. n"
The prophecy became reality. These days I'm glued to my com-
puter screen, to e-mail, to the phone. I feel as if I was suspended in an
immutable reality, receiving and distributing information about my situ-
ation and the limited freedom of expression in Chile. Instead of resum-
39. Id. at 25.
40. Id.
41. Press Release, Committee to Protect Journalists, Chile: Supreme Court, Refuses to
Consider Lifting Ban on Controversial Book (Aug. 29, 2001), available at http://www.cpj.org/
news/2001/chile29aug01 na.html.
42. MATUS, supra note 1.
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ing my role of interviewer, I was placed in the undesired role of
protagonist. From my living room, I have been thrust into the role of
spokesperson for a cause that seems to have as much support as it has
obstacles. My life during the past eighteen months has been dedicated to
keeping the spotlight on my cause and to blocking out icy moments of
indifference. My personal plans have changed time and time again, sub-
ject to the ups and downs of legal proceedings, petitions, and commit-
ments that I've taken on since the banning of my book.
I know I can't separate myself from this reality. I cannot even
describe how much I miss my friends and family, but I also know that
giving up now would only make the possibility of reuniting with them in
Chile even more difficult. I know that even if my book is no longer
banned, I will have to keep on reinventing the meaning of the words so
that this case is not forgotten. So long as it is possible to censor freedom
of expression and to silence political writings, my work will continue. If
future books like The Black Book of Chilean Justice remain in a police
warehouses, all my work will have been in vain. That's what the abusers
are betting on. My silence would be their winning card.
ADDENDUM
In May 2001, the Chilean government repealed Article 6(b) of the
National Security Law, which made it possible to confiscate my book.
Since then, it took me a long eight months to convince the Chilean Judi-
ciary that the law they were using did not exist any more and that they
had to lift the arrest warrant against me, lift the ban over my book, and
over all, put an end to this persecution. They finally did it all at the end
of 2001. This allowed me to come back to my country, where I am now
living and teaching. The sad part of the story is that other forms of
insult laws still exist in my country and that it is still possible to go to
jail for informing truthfully or giving an opinion about a public figure. I
am back doing the usual in my country, but something is different.
Now, I am afraid. I will publish a new book in May. The ban over The
Black Book of Chilean Justice was lifted at the end of 2001, and it has
since been republished. It has not been easy to come back. I still have
some fears. My husband (he is a United States citizen) and I made diffi-
cult decisions, like selling our home in Miami, to return to Chile, but so
far we are happy in Chile. I feel happy to be able to contribute with my
work to Chilean society.
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